- Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Drive Recovery Software
- Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Drives
- Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Driver
In March, researchers uncovered a troubling privacy grab by more than four dozen iOS apps including TikTok, the Chinese-owned social media and video-sharing phenomenon that has taken the Internet by storm. Despite TikTok vowing to curb the practice, it continues to access some of Apple users’ most sensitive data, which can include passwords, cryptocurrency wallet addresses, account-reset links, and personal messages. Another 32 apps identified in March haven't stopped either.
We collected 66 of the best free online miniclip games. These games include browser games for both your computer and mobile devices, as well as apps for your Android and iOS phones and tablets. They include new miniclip games such as Emoji Glass and top miniclip. The now popular 'dribble-drive motion offense' uses a 4-out set and very little screening. You can also use a 1-3-1 or a 1-4 set. For purposes of this discussion, I will use the 3 out, 2 in set (see diagram A). In this set, have the two posts rotate with each other and the three perimeter players rotate in the three outside positions. TikTok and 32 other iOS apps still snoop your sensitive clipboard data Passwords, bitcoin addresses, and anything else in clipboards are free for the taking. Dan Goodin - Jun 27, 2020 4:52 pm UTC.
The privacy invasion is the result of the apps repeatedly reading any text that happens to reside in clipboards, which computers and other devices use to store data that has been cut or copied from things like password managers and email programs. With no clear reason for doing so, researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk found, the apps deliberately called an iOS programming interface that retrieves text from users’ clipboards.
However, if you don't want to use universal clipboard, you can also always send your keyboard content manually by simply pressing a button in the app. Roamit integrates with the Share menu, so you can share any content from any app, and access it from your other device. Roamit works best on Windows 10 devices running Creators update or above. Download and install the app 2. Activate the Universal Copy accessibility service (Settings Accessibility) 3. Go to the app (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube or any app) you want to copy text from 4. Open your notification drawer and click on 'Activate Universal Copy mode' 5. The text zones you will be able to copy from appear in light blue.
Universal snooping
In many cases, the covert reading isn’t limited to data stored on the local device. In the event the iPhone or iPad uses the same Apple ID as other Apple devices and are within roughly 10 feet of each other, all of them share a universal clipboard, meaning contents can be copied from the app of one device and pasted into an app running on a separate device.
That leaves open the possibility that an app on an iPhone will read sensitive data on the clipboards of other connected devices. This could include bitcoin addresses, passwords, or email messages that are temporarily stored on the clipboard of a nearby Mac or iPad. Despite running on a separate device, the iOS apps can easily read the sensitive data stored on the other machines.
“It’s very, very dangerous,” Mysk said in an interview on Friday, referring to the apps’ indiscriminate reading of clipboard data. “These apps are reading clipboards, and there’s no reason to do this. An app that doest have a text field to enter text has no reason to read clipboard text.”
The video below demonstrates universal clipboard reading:
Back in the news
![Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Drive Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Drive](https://static.miniclipcdn.com/layout/icons/default-444x287.png)
While Haj Bakry and Mysk published their research in March, the invasive apps made headlines again this week with the developer beta release of iOS 14. A novel feature Apple added provides a banner warning every time an app reads clipboard contents. As large numbers of people began testing the beta release, they quickly came to appreciate just how many apps engage in the practice and just how often they do it.
This YouTube video, which has racked up more than 87,000 views since it was posted on Tuesday, shows a small sample of the apps triggering the new warning.
TikTok in the spotlight
Recent headlines have focused particular attention on TikTok, in large part because of its massive base of active users (reported to be 800 million, with an estimated 104 million iOS installs in the first half of 2018 alone, making it the most downloaded app for that period).
TikTok’s continued snooping has gotten extra scrutiny for other reasons. When called out in March, the video-sharing provider told UK publication The Telegraph it would end the practice in the coming weeks. Mysk said that the app never stopped the monitoring. What’s more, a Wednesday Twitter thread revealed that the clipboard reading occurred each time a user entered a punctuation mark or tapped the space bar while composing a comment. That means the clipboard reading can happen every second or so, a much more aggressive pace than documented in the March research, which found monitoring happened when the app was opened or reopened.
To reproduce:
1. Have something on your clipboard. Eg copy some text from Notes or a website
2. Open TikTok and start typing in any text field
3. You learn from iOS 14 beta each time an app “pastes” - but in this instance I didn’t request it, and none of that text appears in UI
1. Have something on your clipboard. Eg copy some text from Notes or a website
2. Open TikTok and start typing in any text field
3. You learn from iOS 14 beta each time an app “pastes” - but in this instance I didn’t request it, and none of that text appears in UI
— Jeremy Burge (@jeremyburge) June 24, 2020
In a statement, TikTok representatives wrote:
Following the beta release of iOS14 on June 22, users saw notifications while using a number of popular apps. For TikTok, this was triggered by a feature designed to identify repetitive, spammy behavior. We have already submitted an updated version of the app to the App Store removing the anti-spam feature to eliminate any potential confusion.
TikTok is committed to protecting users' privacy and being transparent about how our app works. We look forward to welcoming outside experts to our Transparency Center later this year.
On background, a spokesperson said that TikTok for Android never implemented the anti-spam feature.
I sent follow-up questions asking (1) if the TikTok version for Android monitored clipboards for any other reason, (2) if any clipboard text was uploaded from the device, and (3) why TikTok didn’t remove the monitoring as promised in March. The spokesperson has yet to respond. This post will be updated if a reply comes later.
Not just TikTok
In all, the researchers found the following iOS apps were reading users’ clipboard data every time the app was opened with no clear reason for doing so: Helicon focus 6 0 18 – software for focus stacking.
- App Name -- BundleID
News
- ABC News -- com.abcnews.ABCNews
- Al Jazeera English — ajenglishiphone
- CBC News -- ca.cbc.CBCNews
- CBS News -- com.H443NM7F8H.CBSNews
- CNBC -- com.nbcuni.cnbc.cnbcrtipad
- Fox News -- com.foxnews.foxnews
- News Break -- com.particlenews.newsbreak
- New York Times -- com.nytimes.NYTimes
- NPR -- org.npr.nprnews
- ntv Nachrichten -- de.n-tv.n-tvmobil
- Reuters -- com.thomsonreuters.Reuters
- Russia Today -- com.rt.RTNewsEnglish
- Stern Nachrichten -- de.grunerundjahr.sternneu
- The Economist -- com.economist.lamarr
- The Huffington Post -- com.huffingtonpost.HuffingtonPost
- The Wall Street Journal -- com.dowjones.WSJ.ipad
- Vice News -- com.vice.news.VICE-News
Games
- 8 Ball Pool™ -- com.miniclip.8ballpoolmult
- AMAZE!!! -- com.amaze.game
- Bejeweled -- com.ea.ios.bejeweledskies
- Block Puzzle --Game.BlockPuzzle
- Classic Bejeweled -- com.popcap.ios.Bej3
- Classic Bejeweled HD --com.popcap.ios.Bej3HD
- FlipTheGun -- com.playgendary.flipgun
- Fruit Ninja -- com.halfbrick.FruitNinjaLite
- Golfmasters -- com.playgendary.sportmasterstwo
- Letter Soup -- com.candywriter.apollo7
- Love Nikki -- com.elex.nikki
- My Emma -- com.crazylabs.myemma
- Plants vs. Zombies™ Heroes -- com.ea.ios.pvzheroes
- Pooking – Billiards City -- com.pool.club.billiards.city
- PUBG Mobile -- com.tencent.ig
- Tomb of the Mask -- com.happymagenta.fromcore
- Tomb of the Mask: Color -- com.happymagenta.totm2
- Total Party Kill -- com.adventureislands.totalpartykill
- Watermarbling -- com.hydro.dipping
Social Networking
- TikTok -- com.zhiliaoapp.musically
- ToTalk -- totalk.gofeiyu.com
- Tok -- com.SimpleDate.Tok
- Truecaller -- com.truesoftware.TrueCallerOther
- Viber -- com.viber
- Weibo -- com.sina.weibo
- Zoosk -- com.zoosk.Zoosk
Other
- 10% Happier: Meditation --com.changecollective.tenpercenthappier
- 5-0 Radio Police Scanner -- com.smartestapple.50radiofree
- Accuweather -- com.yourcompany.TestWithCustomTabs
- AliExpress Shopping App -- com.alibaba.iAliexpress
- Bed Bath & Beyond — com.digby.bedbathbeyond
- Dazn -- com.dazn.theApp
- Hotels.com — com.hotels.HotelsNearMe
- Hotel Tonight — com.hoteltonight.prod
- Overstock -- com.overstock.app
- Pigment – Adult Coloring Book -- com.pixite.pigment
- Recolor Coloring Book to Color -- com.sumoing.ReColor
- Sky Ticket -- de.sky.skyonline
- The Weather Network — com.theweathernetwork.weathereyeiphone
Shortly after the report was published, 10% Happier: Meditation and Hotel Tonight promised to stop the behavior and quickly followed through. TikTik also promised to stop was caught engaging in the practice again. Here's the full list of apps that had curbed the practice as of June 30:
News
Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Drive Recovery Software
- ABC News -- com.abcnews.ABCNews
- Al Jazeera English — ajenglishiphone
- CBC News -- ca.cbc.CBCNews
- CBS News -- com.H443NM7F8H.CBSNews
- ntv Nachrichten -- de.n-tv.n-tvmobil
Games
- 8 Ball Pool™ -- com.miniclip.8ballpoolmult
- AMAZE!!! -- com.amaze.game
- Classic Bejeweled-- com.popcap.ios.Bej3
- Classic Bejeweled HD— com.popcap.ios.Bej3HD
- Letter Soup -- com.candywriter.apollo7
- PUBG Mobile -- com.tencent.ig
- Tomb of the Mask -- com.happymagenta.fromcore
- Tomb of the Mask: Color -- com.happymagenta.totm2
Social Networking
![Miniclip Miniclip](https://static.miniclipcdn.com/images/big-images/TOWER-CRUSH_444x287.jpg)
- TikTok -- com.zhiliaoapp.musically
- Truecaller -- com.truesoftware.TrueCallerOther
- Viber -- com.viber
Other
- 10% Happier: Meditation --com.changecollective.tenpercenthappier
- 5-0 Radio Police Scanner -- com.smartestapple.50radiofree
- Dazn -- com.dazn.theApp
- Hotels.com — com.hotels.HotelsNearMe
- Hotel Tonight — com.hoteltonight.prod
- Recolor Coloring Book to Color -- com.sumoing.ReColor
Clipboard reading done right
In some cases, clipboard reading can make apps much more useful. The UPS iPhone app, for instance, pulls text from the clipboard, and, in the event the text matches the characteristics of a tracking number, the app prompts the user to track the corresponding package. Google Chrome also pulls text and, in the event it’s a URL, will prompt the user to browse to it. The Pixelmator photo editor reads data only if it’s an image. If it is, Pixelmator will prompt the user to open it for editing. In all three cases, the data reading has a clear use case and is transparent.
TikTok and the other offending apps, by contrast, access the clipboard for no clear reason and with no indication they are doing so. For many apps, it’s hard to see any legitimate performance or usability reason for the access. Mysk said that Apple plans to credit his and Haj Bakry’s research as a catalyst for the new clipboard notification put into iOS 14.
The clipboard reading Haj Bakry and Mysk reported raises concerns that likely extend to those using Android and possibly other operating systems. Mysk said that clipboard reading in Android apps is “even worse” than iOS because the OS APIs are so much more lenient. Until version 10, for instance, Android allowed apps running in the background to read the clipboard. iOS apps, by contrast, can read or query clipboards only when active (that is, running in the foreground).
Mysk said that Apple’s notification feature is a good start but, ultimately, Apple and Google should do more. One possibility is to make clipboard access a standard permission, just as access to a mic or camera is now. Another possibility is to require app developers to disclose precisely what clipboard data is accessed and what the app does with it.
For now, users should remain aware that any data stored in the clipboard—despite it being inconspicuous to the naked eye—can be regularly accessed by apps that in many cases aren’t even installed locally on the device. Any video converter repack. When in doubt, flush the clipboard data by copying a character, word, or other piece of innocuous data.
By Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk
UPDATE (MAY 5, 2020): TikTok rolled updates for iOS and Android in May that fixed this vulnerability.
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Videos
- Video manipulation of popular TikTok accounts
- Demonstration of posting spam on WHO’s feed
Summary
The TikTok app uses insecure HTTP to download media content. Like all social media apps with a large userbase, TikTok relies on Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to distribute their massive data geographically. TikTok’s CDN chooses to transfer videos and other media data over HTTP. While this improves the performance of data transfer, it puts user privacy at risk. HTTP traffic can be easily tracked, and even altered by malicious actors. Superphoto 2 20 – add amazing effects to your photos. This article explains how an attacker can switch videos published by TikTok users with different ones, including those from verified accounts.
Introduction
Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Drives
Modern apps are expected to preserve the privacy of their users and the integrity of the information they display to them. Apps which use unencrypted HTTP for data transfer cannot guarantee that the data they receive wasn’t monitored or altered. This is why Apple introduced App Transport Security in iOS 9, to require all HTTP connections to use encrypted HTTPS. Google has also changed the default network security configuration in Android Pie to block all plaintext HTTP traffic.
Apple and Google still provide a way for developers to opt-out of HTTPS for backwards-compatibility. However, this should be the exception rather than the rule, and most apps have made the transition to HTTPS. At the time of writing, TikTok for iOS (Version 15.5.6) and TikTok for Android (Version 15.7.4) still use unencrypted HTTP to connect to the TikTok CDN.
After a short session of capturing and analyzing network traffic from the TikTok app with Wireshark, it is hard to miss the large amounts of data transferred over HTTP. If you inspect the network packets closer, you would clearly spot data of videos and images being transferred in the clear and unencrypted.
Consequently, TikTok inherits all of the known and well-documented HTTP vulnerabilities. Any router between the TikTok app and TikTok’s CDNs can easily list all the videos that a user has downloaded and watched, exposing their watch history. Public Wifi operators, Internet Service Providers, and intelligence agencies can collect this data without much effort.
Figure 1 illustrates the network traffic as captured by Wireshark.
TikTok transports the following content via HTTP:
- Videos: all videos that the app shows
- Profile photos: the profile photos of TikTok accounts
- Video still images: the preview image of a video that is displayed while the video is being downloaded
The captured data shows that videos are downloaded from the following domain names:
- http://v19.muscdn.com
- http://v21.muscdn.com
- http://v34.muscdn.com
In addition, profile photos and still images are downloaded from
http://p16.muscdn.com
.All the content types listed above are prone to tracking. For example, watch history can be created by capturing network traffic downloaded from
http://v34.muscdn.com
.Moreover, a man-in-the-middle attack can alter the downloaded content. For example, swapping profile photos of accounts with forged photos. However, this is not as critical as swapping videos. While a picture is worth a thousand words, a video is certainly worth more. Thus, the attacker can convey more fake facts in a spam video swapped with a video that belongs to a celebrity or a trusted account.
The circulation of misleading and fake videos in a popular platform such as TikTok poses huge risks. That encouraged us to stage a man-in-the-middle attack to swap videos and demonstrate the results. The following section delves deeper into the technical details of our work.
Methodology
We prepared a collection of forged videos and hosted them on a server that mimics the behavior of TikTok CDN servers, namely
v34.muscdn.com
. To make it simple, we only built a scenario that swaps videos. We kept profile photos intact, although they can be similarly altered. We only mimicked the behavior of one video server. This shows a nice mix of fake and real videos and gives users a sense of credibility.To get the TikTok app to show our forged videos, we need to direct the app to our fake server. Because our fake server impersonates TikTok servers, the app cannot tell that it is communicating with a fake server. Thus, it will blindly consume any content downloaded from it.
The trick to direct the app to our fake server is simple; it merely includes writing a DNS record for v34.muscdn.com that maps the domain name to the IP address of our fake server.
This can be achieved by actors who have direct access to the routers that users are connected to. First, a record mapping the domain name v34.muscdn.com to a fake server has to be added to a DNS server. Second, the infected routers have to be configured to use that corrupt DNS server. Now, when the TikTok app tries to look up the IP address of
v34.muscdn.com
, the corrupt DNS server returns the IP address of the fake server. Then, the app will send all subsequent calls to the fake server that is impersonating TikTok’s v34.muscdn.com
.Those actions can be performed by any of the following actors:
- Wifi Operators: operators of public wifi networks can configure the router to use a corrupt DNS server
- VPN providers: a malicious VPN provider can configure a corrupt DNS server for its users
- Internet Service Providers (ISPs): Internet Service Providers such as telecom companies have full access to the internet connections of their customers. They can configure a corrupt DNS server for their customers to swap content or track user activities
- Governments and intelligence agencies: in some countries governments and intelligence agencies can force ISPs to install tools that track or alter data
If you distrust any of these actors, then what you watch on TikTok may have been altered. This also applies to any internet service that uses HTTP.
Figure 2 illustrates the HTTP network traffic directed to the fake server. The highlighted row shows a video request sent by the app to the destination IP
192.168.13.2
, which is the IP address of our fake server. The fake server then picks a forged video and returns it to the app which, in turn, plays the forged video to the user as shown in the demo video. Note that only video requests are directed to the fake server. Requests to download profile photos and still images are directed to the real servers, i.e. we left them unchanged as per our scenario. In contrast, Figure 1 shows a similar video request sent to the real TikTok server with the IP 92.122.188.162
.The forged videos we created present misleading information about COVID-19. This illustrates a potential source of disseminating misinformation and false facts about a contemporary critical topic.
As shown in the demo video and Figures 3-6, the forged videos appeared on popular and verified accounts like @who, @britishredcross, @americanredcross, @tiktok, @lorengray, and @dalia. (@lorengray has over 42 million followers and 2.3 billion likes)
To recap, only users connected to my home router can see this malicious content. However, if a popular DNS server was hacked to include a corrupt DNS record as we showed earlier, misleading information, fake news, or abusive videos would be viewed on a large scale, and this is not completely impossible.
Conclusion
The use of HTTP to transfer sensitive data has not gone extinct yet, unfortunately. As demonstrated, HTTP opens the door for server impersonation and data manipulation. We successfully intercepted TikTok traffic and fooled the app to show our own videos as if they were published by popular and verified accounts. This makes a perfect tool for those who relentlessly try to pollute the internet with misleading facts.
Miniclip 3 2 – Universal Clipboard Driver
TikTok, a social networking giant with around 800 million monthly active users, must adhere to industry standards in terms of data privacy and protection.